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use#LAA"Truth"  Is Stranger than Prediction, More 
Questionable than Causal Inference* 
Gary King,  Department of Government, Harvard University 
Robert Luskin's article in this issue provides a useful service by  appropri- 
ately qualifying several points I made in my  1986 American Journal of Political 
Science article. Whereas I  focused on how to avoid common mistakes in quan- 
titative political science, Luskin clarifies ways to extract some useful information 
from usually problematic statistics: correlation coefficients, standardized coeffi- 
cients, and especially RZ.  Since these three statistics are very closely related (and 
indeed deterministic functions of  one another in  some cases), I focus in  this 
discussion primarily on R2, the most widely used and abused. Luskin also widens 
the discussion to various kinds of  specification tests, a general issue I also ad- 
dress. In fact, as Beck (1991) reports, a large number of  formal specification 
tests are just functions of R2, with differences among them primarily due to how 
much  each  statistic penalizes  one for  including extra parameters  and  fewer 
observations. 
Reasons for Concern about Model Specification 
Quantitative  political  scientists often  worry  about  model  selection and 
specification, asking questions about parameter identification, autocorrelated or 
heteroscedastic disturbances, parameter constancy,  variable choice,  measure- 
ment error, endogeneity, functional forms, stochastic assumptions, and selection 
bias, among numerous others. These model specification questions are all im- 
portant, but we may have forgotten why we pose them. Political scientists com- 
monly give three reasons: (I) finding the "true"  model, or the "full"  explana- 
tion; (2) prediction; and (3) estimating specific causal effects. I argue here that 
(1) is used the most but useful the least; (2) is very useful but not usually in 
political science where forecasting is not often a central concern; and (3) cor- 
rectly represents the goals of political scientists and  should form the basis of 
most of our quantitative empirical work. 
*My thanks  go to Jim Alt  and Neal  Beck for many  helpful discussions  and the  National 
Science Foundation for grant SES-89-09201. 
'In King (1991) I responded to a related critique of my 1986 AJPS article by Lewis-Beck and 
Skalaban (1991). The arguments here complement, but usually do not supplement, those by focusing 
on more general methodological issues. 
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Finding the "True" Model 
Although Luskin speaks of all three reasons at times, he focuses principally 
on the first one. For example, at one point he writes, "But now suppose, more 
realistically, that the model may be incorrect. Perhaps a major influence has been 
omitted." He qualifies this at another point by seeking a model relatively "more 
true":  "We  shall never discover the 'true'  regression function, known only to 
God, but the smaller the R2, the likelier it is, other things being equal, that we 
could come up with a truer one." Finally, Luskin adds, "A  further qualification 
is that the truest model may not be the best," an argument that is unclear at best 
(after all, if  we introduce the criterion of "truth,"  how can one justify a less true 
model?). 
The search for the true model is the most frequently cited justification for 
model specification tests in the political science literature, but I believe it to be 
largely vacuous. First, although I fully accept the premise that knowable truths 
exist in the world, the idea of a "true  model" makes no sense. My point is not 
the usual cynical caveat that we can never attain perfection. Instead, a model is 
necessarily (and preferably) an abstraction and thus a drastic simplification, one 
that if successful will enable one to study only the essential elements of reality. 
Models may be good or bad for some purpose or another, but labeling models as 
true or false is not fruitful. Can one distinguish between true and false models of 
an airplane? Presumably either all models are false or the only true (sufficiently 
realistic) model is the airplane itself (although even actual airplanes do differ 
from one another). In either case, the goal of finding a "true  model"  is neither 
worthy nor useful. The concept of a "true model"  also dredges up misleading 
goals of  "perfect predictions,"  something we know to be impossible in a proba- 
bilistic world (or even in a deterministic world where we know we shall never 
have knowledge and measures of every possible influence). 
Second, even if the meaning of  a "true model"  were perfectly clear, this 
goal does not represent the pursuit of a substantive political science question and 
thus generates particularly bad research designs. In order to reduce uncertainty, 
one should always seek to maximize leverage over research questions-by  in- 
creasing the number of observations and finding evidence for as many observable 
implications of a theory as possible, as well as limiting the number of inferences 
we must make with the same set of data. If  we start with a dependent variable 
and try to search for all possible (or all "big"  or all "important")  explanatory 
variables, we shall continually lose leverage over the problem. For each addi- 
tional causal inference we wish to explore (or explanatory variable we add to an 
equation), the precision with which we can know all the other causal inferences 
in our study diminishes. By pursuing this goal, our "success"  at finding more 
causes will automatically produce failure in learning about any one. Whenever 
possible, one should design research so as to focus on a small number of particu- 
larly important research questions (or, as I shall argue below, causal inferences). TRUTH IS STRANGER THAN PREDICTION 
Prediction 
Prediction is by  far the most straightforward of  the three justifications for 
asking model specification questions, since it provides an extremely clear goal 
and  an  unambiguous  and  uncontroversial standard for judging  success.  One 
simply compares one's  forecasts to future realizations of the process being ex- 
plained. Thus, in this case, R2 and the whole battery of specification tests men- 
tioned by  Luskin are irrelevant. In fact, there are numerous circumstances in 
which large values of  R2 (and the other specification tests) produce especially 
bad out-of-sample predictions (see Beck 1991). Inasmuch as political scientists 
do not often find themselves forecasting the processes they model, and since the 
solution to model specification here is so much easier and more obvious, I put 
this aside for now. 
Estimating Causal Effects 
A final reason for asking model specification questions is to improve causal 
inference, a goal that I believe to be at the heart of most of  what we are and 
should be doing in quantitative political scien~e.~  If we do not apply the proper 
specification tests, we can easily make incorrect inferences. For example, omit- 
ted variable bias can cause one incorrectly to attribute the explanatory power of 
an omitted variable to the key causal effect we are trying to estimate. Measure- 
ment error similarly can bias estimates of causal effects. Ignoring any of these 
or other model specification questions may have serious consequences for the 
estimation of causal effects. Statistics that help us to evaluate whether we have 
omitted variables, measurement error, selection bias, and the like, therefore are 
extremely important in pursuing this goal. 
Once we drop the goal of  finding the "true"  model and focus on making 
causal inferences (or predictions), using R2 to distinguish between "true"  and 
"less true"  models is pointless. Since I find that methodological disagreements 
frequently evaporate when real data or examples are discussed, and since neither 
this paper (until now) nor Luskin's  includes an example, consider the following. 
Suppose one is interested in the causal effect of crude oil prices on the public's 
opinion as to whether there is an energy shortage. One can imagine gathering 
50 opinion polls about this question over as many months and regressing opinion 
on prices (probably also controlling for lagged opinion in some form), a reason- 
able specification if one wishes to learn about this causal effect. Furthermore, 
one could calculate an R2 value. Now suppose we also found a monthly measure 
of the amount of television news coverage of oil price rises. Should we include 
TV coverage in the original equation? This variable is probably a major influence 
on public opinion about the existence of  an energy crisis, and it will be highly 
ZEstimating  effect parameters  from linear regression equations is one way  of gauging these 
causal relationships, but numerous other statistical methods are also used. Gary King 
correlated with oil prices. If  we omit this variable, would we not bias our infer- 
ence? If we include it, R2 will certainly rise by  a good deal. Indeed, most of the 
specification tests discussed by Luskin would unambiguously point to including 
a TV coverage variable in  the equation. However, if  we  are interested in  the 
causal effect of  oil prices per se, it makes little sense to control for a variable 
such as TV coverage, since it is in part a consequence of our key causal variable. 
If we controlled for it, we would be underestimating the causal effect of  oil prices 
on public ~pinion.~  (Similarly, if  we were interested in the effect of party iden- 
tification on  voting behavior,  we  would  not  control for  the voter's  intention 
five minutes before walking into the voting booth!) Thus, the best specification 
in this typical example includes just the oil price ~ariable.~ 
Now suppose instead that we are primarily interested in the causal effect of 
TV coverage of  oil prices on public opinion about an energy shortage. In this 
case, we  clearly should control for oil prices. Oil prices are both prior to and 
correlated with TV coverage; controlling for oil prices will largely eliminate a 
plausible confounding influence. As noted above, RZ  in this modified equation 
will be a good deal higher than in the original. 
Thus, the "right model"  depends entirely on the use to which it is put-the 
precise causal inference (or prediction) one wishes to make.5 In this example, 
and in most others, a "true model"  does not exist even in theory, but there is no 
"universally best" model either. The usefulness of a particular model specifica- 
tion depends entirely on what causal or forecasting goals one pursues. The sec- 
ond model fits the data better than the first, but the fit of  the model to our data, 
as measured by RZ  or any other statistic, is largely irrelevant to the specific goal 
of our analy~is.~  Indeed, the first model has a substantially lower RZ,  but for the 
purposes of that model it is considerably better. Thus, our theoretical reason for 
a model is our best guide to specification. Large RZ  values are not even empiri- 
cally associated with better models in gened7 
30f  course, we might wish to include it for a different purpose, such as I describe below or for 
separating this total effect into a direct and indirect effect of oil prices through television coverage. 
However, these are still different research purposes,  for which we would generally want different 
models. 
4Note  that we arrived at this specification without any reference to the concept of parsimony. 
This is what Luskin is getting at when he speaks of a true model existing only "at  a given 
causal distance." 
'jThis is not to say'that we should ignore residual plots and the like, since they can often suggest 
other hypotheses or different plausible confounding effects. One should always attempt to extract as 
much information from our data as possible. (This  is indeed another reason why Luskin's article is 
valuable: if we read an article that presents only what one would consider the wrong statistics, it still 
makes sense to see if we can extract all available information from it.) 
7To make the point in a somewhat different way, suppose we continue with the example about 
the influence of TV coverage of oil price rises on public opinion about an energy shortage. However, 
on this occasion suppose we construct an almost perfectly controlled, randomized, and very large-n 
experiment to estimate the causal effect. In this event, we can omit oil prices and indeed all other TRUTH IS STRANGER THAN PREDICTION  1051 
Although he may not have been thinking about a "true model"  and model 
specification statistics, Mark Twain said aptly, "Why shouldn't truth be stranger 
than fiction? Fiction, after all, has to make sense." 
Uses for Relatively Unfit Fit Statistics 
Finally, I turn to the most important contribution of Luskin's article. That 
is, when these statistics are used, how should we interpret them? I entirely agree 
with Luskin that one can glean relevant information from them, but we disagree 
somewhat about the interpretation and  most useful form for this information. 
Anyone having looked at a lot of regression output will be led to the impression 
that R2  does not seem crazy: it tends to be high when coefficients are large and 
standard errors small. 
However, in my  1986 article, I claimed that the regression model contains 
no parameter for which R2  is an estimate. The veracity of this argument is proved 
again by Luskin's equation (I), which is a fine statement of  a regression model 
and which includes no parameter for R2  to estimate. Although Luskin includes 
an interesting argument that proves that as the number of observations increase, 
RZ  converges in probability to a fixed point, which he labels p2  (and defines as 
1 - &lu$),  he must assume that the "correct"  explanatory variables are in- 
cluded in the model in order to show that RZ  is a reasonable estimate of p2.  That 
is, his probability limit calculations are conditional on prior knowledge of  the 
correct specification. Of course, the "correct"  specification depends entirely on 
the causal or predictive purpose of  the model, as well  as one's  current priors 
about the specification and even preliminary experience with the data. Hence, 
the proof presupposes that one already knows the answer to his most important 
question. In other words, RZ  measures no parameter  in the regression model, 
and the parameter  it does estimate is not at all helpful in choosing a particular 
model specijication. 
I  show in King (1991) that R2  and the standard error of  the regression, 6, 
contain precisely the same information; however, R2  expresses it in a form much 
more likely to mislead. I demonstrate this in a different way here in the following 
- 
possible control variables (since they would be uncorrelated with the treatment variable, TV cover- 
age). This research design will provide a very reliable estimate of the causal effect. Suppose, how- 
ever, that R2  is only 0.03.  This R2  value might indicate that numerous unmeasured variables affect 
public opinion as to the existence of an energy shortage, but that is entirely irrelevant to our purpose, 
which was to estimate a causal effect, not the unattainable (and unclear) goal of determining every 
possible cause of public opinion. 
sWe all agree that maximizing R2  will not get us anywhere. However, suppose we could ob- 
serve p2.  If we maximized it with respect to the specification, we would still not produce the right 
model,  since in this formulation the correct,specification is a condition,  not something to be esti- 
mated.  Trying to do so is  essentially  the  same mistake  as using  inverse probability  to estimate 
parameters when one should be using likelihood or a Bayesian posterior distribution (see King 1989). 1052  Gary King 
three examples. First, suppose one is estimating the effect of  unemployment on 
presidential approval, measured by the monthly Gallup opinion polls. The inher- 
ent sampling error of one of  these polls is about 2%. If  we obtain a value of 6 
smaller than this figure, we would know something is seriously wrong with the 
model  specification: no statistical model  can generate predictions of  numbers 
more accurately than they can be measured. Although with 6  we can sometimes 
see when we are overfitting a data set, doing the same with RZ  would be difficult. 
More obvious, perhaps, is the relative frequency with which the two statis- 
tics are misused. Although statistical practice has been improving substantially 
in recent years, finding four or five consecutive issues of a major journal without 
some misuse of  Rz-even  a misuse that Luskin and I agree about-would  be 
fairly difficult. However, finding even a single misuse of 6,  other than omission, 
is quite challenging (though not impossible!). 
Finally, consider this thought experiment. Suppose one group of  people 
were given a regression equation, RZ,  and the variance of the dependent variable, 
whereas another group were given the same equation, the variance of the depen- 
dent variable, and the corresponding value of 6. Which group would re-create 
the scatter plot more accurately without the benefit of  seeing the original data? 
Each group would have essentially the same information. However, since the 
first group would need to recall how to compute 6 from RZ and the variance 
of  the dependent variable, I think most would expect the second group to out- 
perform the first. Thus, even as a measure of fit, something that is not terribly 
interesting, 6  is more useful than R2.9 
The thrust of  Luskin's article is well taken and very useful. In his words, 
"Weathervanes and anemometers in the cities do not diminish the value of  a wet 
finger aloft in the wilderness." True though this may be, I would prefer a meteo- 
rologist in a well-equipped weather station. 
9Luskin also warns about standardized coefficients but indicates that they contain useful infor- 
mation because they represent causal effects and the  "variables capacity for change."  I agree that 
we should always look at both pieces of information. However, why confound the two by combining 
them in one number? More important is that standardized coefficients do not properly measure the 
"variables  capacity  for change."  For example, consider the variable age. For any one year, this 
variable changes by  exactly one unit (year); however, if  we judged by  the standard deviation in a 
cross-section,  we might incorrectly think that the age of  a person could change by  30 points in a 
single year! The situation is even more extreme for race or gender, or even income.  Standardized 
coefficients tend to be used primarily in cross-sectional data, but their use in time series data is not 
much better. For example, most economic variables change quite gradually over time, but many vary 
over large ranges when looking across many years. Inflation, for example, will increase or decrease 
by a point or two over a year, but the standard deviation over a multiyear data set would indicate that 
the  variables short-term capacity for change is enormous-perhaps  10 points or more. Luskin is 
correct that standardized coefficients contain some useful information, but as with the other statistics, 
there are better forms. TRUTH IS STRANGER THAN PREDICTION 
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